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Politics, Science and Public Policy: 
An Essay on the Use and Abuse of Behavioral Theory 0 
JosEPH P. VITERI'ITI 
Urban Academy-City University of New York 
In 1957 Professor Leo Strauss criticized the idea of a positivist social 
science on the grounds that it is impossible to study social phenomena 
without inserting value judgments.1 Strauss' comment was merely a pre-
lude to the great debate which would occur within the political science 
profession between traditional thinkers and the more modem behavior-
ists, a conflict which would reach its height in 1969 when Sheldon Wolin 
found occasions to draw a distinction between the "vocation of the the-
orist" and the "vocation of the methodist." 2 The boundaries between the 
two camps have now become more opaque in a "post-behavioral" era 
when an attempt is being made to integrate normative and emperical 
concerns. Yet the question still remains , "To what extent can politics 
be made into a scientific endeavor?" 
This paper supports Strauss' notion that it is both impossible and 
undesirable to exclude values from the study of social phenomena. A 
consideration of major trends within the behavioral movement will cast 
some light on the important role which values continue to play in the 
field of systematic political inquiry. This role, we will see, has gained 
increased recognition among practitioners of the behavioral approach. 
Contrary to Strauss' position, we do not believe that the behavior-
alists' failure to create value free discipline necessarily excludes their 
work from the realm of science. In order to determine the extent to 
which politics can or should be made into a scientific enterprise, it is 
necessary to deal with this long debated issue on two levels. The first 
level concerns politics as a field of inquiry. Here the question is episte-
mological. The second concerns politics as ,a field of governmental 
action. Here the problem is one of application, i.e. the utilization of 
scientific knowledge within the policy making process. 
In considering the first question we would argue that much of the 
criticism leveled against behavioralism for its alleged inability to con-
0 I am gratefully indebted to Professor Dankwart A. Rustow of the City Uni-
versity of New York for his many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. Responsibility for the position presented herein is entirely mine. 
1 Strauss, "What is Political Philosophy," Journal of Politics, XIX, 3 (August , 
1957), pp. 347-348. 
2 Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," American Political Science Review, 
63 ( December, 1969 ) , p . 1062. 
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form to scientific standards is based on inaccurate assumptions about the 
nature of science. By critically examining some of the premises and 
promises of scientific investigation, we will attempt to demonstrate that 
the theoretical and methodological deficiencies which critics often at-
tribute to social research are common elements within the natural and 
social sciences alike. Therefore , such deficiencies as real as they might be, 
would not necessarily exclude behavioralism from the realm of science. 
The limits to which politics can be made into a scientific venture 
are more readily defined when we consider the problem of applying 
knowledge in government. These limitations are both empirical and 
normative in nature . On the one hand , there is no mechanism within 
the political system which guarantees that information resulting from 
scientific research will be utilized or heeded by those responsible for 
the formation of public policy. To the contrary, such data is frequently 
ignored when it calls for governmental action which is not in accord-
ance with the preferences of powedul interests. On the other hand, any 
attempt to insure that the system will be totally responsive to the dic-
tates of scientific knowledge raises the potential danger of a techno-
cratic government. Any serious consideration of the prospects for a 
science of politics cannot afford a failure to recognize the serious norma-
tive issues underlying this dilemma. This paper does not propose any 
claim toward a solution. However, it will attempt to explain how the 
institutions of our government can operate to allow science to exert a 
rationalizing effect on the political process without undermining the 
democratic values of the system. Based on Max Weber's motion of an 
ideal bureaucracy we will argue that it is the administrative branch of 
government which affords us the best opportunity to utilize the tech-
niques and the knowledge of the various sciences in the formulation and 
implementation of public policy. 
I. SCIENCE , VALUES AND THE STUDY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
The behavioral movement within the social sciences originated with 
the work of John B. Watson , a psychologist. His work was essentially a 
reaction ,to the "introspective or subjective" psychology of Wundt, Freud 
and James , whose subject matter, consciousness, he believed "can be 
analyzed only by looking in on what takes place inside of us." 8 By con-
centrating on the study of human behavior through experimental meth-
ods, behaviorist psychologists sought to create "a natural science that 
takes the whole field of human adjustments as its own."~ As Watson 
explained it: 
8 Watson, Behao iorism (New York: W. W . Norton & Company , 1930), p . 5. 
~ Ibid., p. 11. 
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The interest of the behaviorist in man's doings is more than the 
interest of the spectator-he wants to control man's reaction as 
physical scientists want to control or manipulate other natural phe-
nomena. It is the business of behavioristic psychology to be able 
to predict and control human activity. 6 
One of Watson's mo&t loyal disciples and until this day the most . 
significant popularizer of his ideas is B. F. Skinner. Skinner expressed 
a concern with the uneven development of science which has "extended 
our control of inanimate nature without preparing for the serious social 
problems which follow." 6 He espoused the methods and goals of his 
predecessor, but ,then took the case a step further by attempting to come 
to grips with the political ,and moral implications of the behaviorist 
venture. Recognizing government as that agency most suited to control 
human behavior, Skinner anticipated critical reaction from democratic 
idealists who would raise questions concerning the threat of a scientific 
despotism.7 Reminding his critics that "it has always been the unfor-
tunate task of science to dispossess cherished beliefs", Skinner advocated 
a system of government for the people rather than a government by the 
people. 8 He expressed a firm belief in the power of science to tell social 
designers what type of action is necessary to produce a given result or 
more generally , what type of government will necessarily promote the 
well being of those who are govemed. 9 As a modem day Galileo, Skin-
ner saw science as a means to overcome the individual and social biases 
of his environment, but he did not hesitate to emphasize that his science 
might also "provide mankind with ,a set of moral values." 10 The idea of 
creating a new culture based on scientifically determined values is prob-
ably the most ambitious claim of behaviorist psychology. 
Several scholars are responsible for initiating the twentieth century 
effort to create a new science of politics, including , among others, Arthur 
Bentley , James Bryce, Graham Wallace and Stuart Rice. However, the 
individual most frequently credited with the distinction of fathering the 
behavioral movement in politics is Professor Charles Merriam of the 
University of Chicago. It was in 1921 when Merriam's article appeared 
in the America Political Science Review outlining four key ingredients 
5 Ibid. 
6 Skinner, Science and Ht1man Behavior ( New York: Macmillan, 1953 ), p. 4. 
7 A recent defense of Skinner's writing appears in his book About Behaviorism 
(New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 1974). A comprehensive listing of commentaries on 
his work is found in Peter Stillman, ' 'The Limits of Behaviorism," American Political 
Science Review LXIX ( March, 1975). 
8 Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, p. 449. 
9 Ibid., p . 443. 
10 Ibid ., p. 445. 
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which he believed were necessary for the development of a more rig-
orous discipline. They included: 
1. More adequate equipment for the collection and analysis of 
political material; 
2. More adequate organization of the political prudence of the 
profession; 
3. Broader use of ,the instruments of social observation from sta-
tistics, and the analytical techniques of psychology; 
4. Coordination of technical political research with the work of 
other closely allied fields.11 
Merriam looked forward to a "new politics" which would synthesize 
the work of the older and newer disciplines. He had praise for psy-
chologists' study of behavior, sociologists' use of surveys and the case 
study method, and the rigorous techniques employed by natural scien-
tists. However, Meniam was also well aware of the obstacles which 
political scientists would face because of the elusive nature of their 
subject matter, such as the difficulty in analyzing phenomena in order 
to establish causal relationships, the problem of separating the person-
ality of the observer from the social situation of which he is a part, and 
the absence of the controlled experiment. l2 
In his own research, Merriam isolated the idea of "power" hoping 
to use it as a central organizing concept in politics in much the same 
way as the physicist uses the concepts of space or motion. 13 The idea 
was hardly an original contribution to Western thought, yet Merriam's 
emphasis on "power" certainly foreshadowed the important role the con-
cept would play in the research of later behavioralists. Merriam's great-
est contribution to the discipline was that he articulated a set of goals 
which political scientists took seriously enough so that the notion of a 
behavioral movement could be transformed into a reality. Unfortunately 
he did little himself to create the methodology and approach which was 
then called for.14 
The consequences which resulted from Merriam's effort to revolu-
tionize the study of politics became most apparent in the work of his 
most successful and controversial student, Harold D. Lasswell. Lass-
11 Merriam, Am erican Political Science Review, 15 (May, 1921), pp. 184-185. 
12 Merriam, New Aspects of Politics ( Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 
1925), pp. 135-138. 
13 Cf Merriam, Political Power ( New York: Collier, 1964). 
14 A critical survey of Merriam's career is found in Bernard Crick's The 
American Science of Politics (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1959). pp. 
133-155. Further commentaries appear in Barry Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the 
Study of Politics ( Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
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well's career is of particular interest because it is representative of the 
slow and uneven course of the behavioral movement; it is indicative of 
the conceptions and the misconceptions held by those thinkers who 
emulated the scientillc tradition as a model for the new politics. 
David Easton has identified two distinct phases in Lasswell's his-
toric career, an "elitist amoral phase" and a "decisional moral phase." 15 
In the first stage, which Easton dates from 1934 to 1940, Lasswell's pur-
pose was to create a purely objective science of politics and rid political 
inquiry of all values. Like his teacher at Chicago, Lasswell concentrated 
on the study of power and the manipulative techniques utilized by those 
who wield it.16 He defined political science as . . . . "the study of in-
fluence and the influential" and concluded "the influential are those who 
get whatever there is to get." 17 However, Lasswell's elitist approach to 
the study of power, which had strong ideological ties with the writings 
of Pareto, was in the fact value laden. As Easton explained it, the notion 
that political power is always concentrated in the hands of an elite im-
plies that democracy or majority rule can never be achieved. 18 There-
fore although early behavioralists differed from behaviorist psychologists 
by attempting to exclude values from scientific investigation, their de-
scriptive analysis of the distribution of power in modem society was no 
less objectionable to liberal democratic theorists. 19 
No individual has done more than Lasswell to integrate the tech-
niques of modem psychology with the research of political scientists. 
His psychological profile of political characters which was written in 
1930 remains a classic innovation within the behavioral movement. 20 
However it is significant to point out that behavioralist Lasswell utilized 
the very methodology to which Watsonian behaviorism was a reaction, 
psychoanalysis. His study includes several flattering references to the 
contributions which Freud has made in "subjective psychology." 21 This 
"subjective" approach, along with the normative connotations implied 
in Lasswell's emphasis on "pathology", represents an early point at which 
16 Easton, "Har old Lasswell, Policy Scientist For a Democratic Society," Journal 
of Politics, 12 ( 1950), p. 459. 
16 Lasswell first concentrated on the topic in his doctoral dissertation, Propaganda 
Technique in the World War (New York: Alfred Knoph, 1927). His classic work on 
power is, of course, Politics, Who Gets What, When, How? (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1936). 
17 Lasswell, Politics, Who Gets What, When, How, op. cit., p. 13. 
18 East on, op. cit., p. 462. 
19 Though Easton relates Lasswell's approach primarily to Pareto, this orienta-
tion was also evident in the work of other Europeans such as Geatano Mosca and 
Robert Michels. For a critical analysis of this tradition see David Spitz, Patterns of 
Anti-Democratic Thought ( New York: Free Press, 1949). 
20 Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics ( Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1930). 
21 Ibid., p . 12. 
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he overtly, although unintentionally , introduced his own values into 
his work. 
That part of Lasswell's career which Easton labeled the "decisional 
moral phase" amounted to an absolute turnabout in Lasswell's attitude 
on the place of values in social inquiry. Now concerned with the de-
velopment of a "science of democracy" , Lasswell announced the value 
goals of his own research in terms of justice, human dignity, majority 
rule, shared powers, and freedom. 22 This approach was accompanied 
by a new orientation in the study of power. Power was defined as "par-
ticipation in the making of important decisions ." 2 8 In order to reconcile 
his empirical research with his newly announced value goals, Lasswell 
drew a meaningful distinction between political leaders ( or decision 
makers) and a political elite. As he explained it: 
The distinction between leaders and the elite enables us to avoid 
the confusion that often arises when someone points out that gov-
ernment is always government by the few, whether carried out in 
the name of the few, or the one, or the many . . . . The proposition 
is true when ill: is understood to mean that "government is always 
government by a few leaders ". It is false when construed to mean 
that "government is always government by a highly restricted elite", 
and that democracy is by definition impossible. 24 
Following the inSitructions of Professor Merriam, Lasswell made a 
noble attempt to integrate the work of natural and social scientists in 
order to rationalize the political process. The new "science of democ-
racy" was identified as a "policy science" designed to clarify the goals 
of a democratic society and set down a methodology through which 
these goals could be realized. This commitment to democratic values 
was not understood as an obstacle to objective investigation. Lasswell 
explains: 
The policy approach does not mean that the scientist abandons 
objectivity in gathering or interpreting data . . . The policy em-
phasis calls for a choice of problems which will contribute to the 
goal values of the scientist, and the use of scrupulous objectivity 
22 See, for instanc e, Lasswell, Power and Personality (N ew York : W. W. Norton 
and Compan y, 1948), p . 107; The Analy sis of Political Behavior (N ew York: 
Oxford University Press, 1948 ), pp. 2-8 ; with Abrah am Kaplan , Power and Society 
(N ew Haven: Yale University Press, 1950 ), p. VIII. 
23 Lasswell, Th e Analy sis of Political Behavi01', op, cit., p . 68. 
H Power and Personality, op. cit ., p . XII . 
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and maximum technical ingenuity in executing the projects un-
dertaken. 2n 
After having spent a large part of his early career studying the 
language symbols and manipulative techniques of political elites, Lass-
well became convinced that it was now possible to determine the type 
of political action necessary in order to achieve a particular set of goals. 
Although his goals were democratic, the methodology which Lasswell 
was ready to employ in order to apply such scientific knowledge mani-
fests a striking resemblance to the behavioral controls advocated by be-
haviorist psychologists. This is most evident in the introduction to his 
Power and SociettJ which reads: 
The result of inquiry is a warranted statement of the way in which 
an actor is a situation can increase the probability of an occurrence 
of a specified state of affairs. "To produce Y ( or to make Y most 
likely to occur), do XI 26 
It is unfortunate that Lasswell did not come to grips with the fact that 
his own methodology could be anathema to the democratic values he 
so strongly espoused. 
The policy science approach is certainly more practicable than Lass-
well's "amoral politics", which amounted to an unsuccessful attempt to 
completely divorce values from social inquiry. The distinction between 
propositions of fact and propositions of value at least temporarily defines 
one area of politics which remains outside the realm of science, the de-
termination of political ends. However the application of behavioralism 
as an instrument to such ends does not preclude the possibility, sug-
gested by Merriam, that the personal biases of social scientist at work 
in their own environment might affect the quality of empirical obser-
vation. While empirical social research cannot be used as a means for 
determining human values, human values will continue to play a role 
in determining both the direction and the product of empirical social 
research. As long as values influence the purpose and the character of 
behavioral inquiry, skeptics can be expected to raise questions concern-
ing the scientific merit of such investigation. These questions cannot 
be dealt with adequately however, without first devoting some attention 
to clarifying the meaning and ,the nature of science. 
25 Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, The Policy Sciences ( Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1951 ), p. 14. 
26 Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. XII. 
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II. SCIENCE: ITS PREMISES A D PROMISES 
Albert Einstein defined science as an "attempt to make chaotic 
diversity into a system of thought." 27 How successful science can be in 
responding to this summons is dependent on the ability of its practi-
tioners to abide by the rigorous standards inherent in the scientific tra-
dition. In more precise terms than Einstein, Herbert Feigl defines the 
aims of science as description, explanation and prediction. 28 He then 
proceeds to set down a core of standards which he believes should regu-
late any quest for scientific knowledge. They are as follows: 
l. Intersubjective Testability: 
This standard of "objectivity" involves "freedom from personal 
or cultural bias" and "the requirement that the knowledge claims 
of science be capable of test." 29 In accordance with the latter 
point Karl Popper has emphasized that "falsifiability is the mark 
of science." 80 
2. Reliability or a Significant Degree of Confirmation: 
This criterion differing from the first only by matter of degree, 
"enables us to distinguish ... "mere opinion" from scientific 
knowledge ( well substantiated belief)." 81 
3. Definit eness of Precision: 
This standard requires that "the concepts used in the formula-
tion of scientific knowledge claims be as definitely delimited as 
possible", hence the application of quantitative techniques. 32 In 
accordance with this criterion, Ernest Nagel, among others, notes 
the need for an exact language or technical vocabulary. 38 
4. Coherence or Systematic Structure: 
This calls for "a well connected account of the facts" as opposed 
to a "mere colleotion of miscellaneous items of information."" 
27 Einstein "Considerations Concerning the Fundamentals of Theoretical Physics," 
Science, 91 (May 24, 1940), p. 487. 
28 Feig), "The Scientific Outlook: aturalism and Humanism," in Herbert Feig( 
and May Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crogts, 1953), p. 10. 
20 Ibid. , p. 11. 
80 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery ( ew York: Harper and Row, 
1965), pp. 40-42. 
s1 Feigle, op. cit., p. 12. 
82 Ibid. 
88 Nagel, The Structure of Science ( ew York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc ., 
1961), pp. 8-9. 
84 Feigl, op. cit., p. 12. 
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5. Comprehensiveness or Scope of Knowledge: 
This characterizes scientific knowledge as "different in degree 
from common sense knowledge." Science is believed to acquire 
"a reach far beyond the limits of our unaided senses ... not to 
be confused with the sham completeness metaphysics procure 
for their world pictures by verbal magic." 86 
Feig! concludes by stating that the aims of applied science are 
"practical control , production , guidance , therapy and reform." 86 These 
aims have a marked similarity to the purposes adopted by behaviorists 
Watson and Skinner, not to mention Lasswell. However Feigl's analysis 
of standards leaves one with a rather flattering impression of the scien-
tific venture and it is bewildering to the student of society who would 
hope to observe the tradition as it is here understood. 
Rigorous standards are in order if science is to maintain its position 
as a respected fmm of inquiry. However a realistic appraisal of its per-
formance is necessary if we are to determine whether behavioralism 
rightfully deserves a place within its bounds. A closer consideration of 
the intellectual process carried out by natural scientists will show that 
Feigl's standards are more representative of an ideal than a reality. 
Therefore the demands of science are not so prohibitive to the student 
of social phenomena as one might be led to expect. 
The commitment to ensure objectivity in scientific investigation , 
although necessary and desirable from a methodological point of view, 
is inevitably frustrated by the human element which is part and parcel 
of the whole investigatory process. As Michael Polanyi has explained, 
all hum an inquiry is initially motivated by "intellectual passion." 87 
Thomas Kuhn has perceptively pointed out that intellectual partisan-
ship is a common feature of any scientific endeavor which is carried out 
for the purpose of replacing established theories ( or paradigms) with 
new systems of analysis. 88 Galileo, for example, who endured great hard-
ship for disassociating himself from the religious and cultural biaes of 
his time in order to revolutionize the study of astronomy, performed his 
work with an emotional commitment which bordered on obsession.89 
Kuhn goes on to explain that scientific partisans will frequently re-
fuse to accept empirical data which contradicts theories to which they 
30
• Ib id., p. 13. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Polanyi, The Study of Man (London : Routledge, 1959 ), p . 13. 
38 Kuhn, The Structur e of Scientific Revolutions ( Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962 ), p . 8. 
89 For a well documented and enjoyable account of Galileo's heroic efforts see 
Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers (New York: Universal Library, 1963). pp. 352-
463. 
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are personally committed; they simply proceed to search for new evi-
dence in order to provide themselves with the satisfaction of support.•o 
Behavioral scientist Lasswell is merely a case in point. When his em-
pirical conclusions about the elitist structure of power were found con-
tradictory to his democratic ideals , Lasswell developed a new method 
of analysis (the decision-making approach) which produced evidence 
that was more consistenrt with his own values. Hence the ends of scien-
tific research, both natural and social, are to some extent determined by 
the personal biases and values of those who carry it out. The important 
question to consider at this point is: To what extent is the quality of 
this research influenced by non-empirical factors? 
Despite proverbial claims to the contrary, a large parrt of natural 
science is based on metaphysical propositions. The most significant of 
these propositions is a belief in a natural order which gives birth to the 
concepts of causality and inductive reasoning. 41 When once asked by 
Reichenbach how he came upon the theory of relativity, Einstein re-
sponded that he found it because he was thoroughly convinced of the 
harmony of the universe. 42 Some prominent historians of science have 
traced ithe idea of a natural order to religious origins, asserting that it 
was based on the belief that a rational God created a perfect universe 
which functions in a clocklike fashion. •3 
The integrity of a scientific knowledge is frequently measured by 
the methodology which is used to verify it. Since the foundation upon 
which natural science frequently bases its claims of precision is mathe-
matics, at least part of the myth concerning the authority of scientific 
information is related to misunderstandings about the nature of mathe-
matics. Even a schoolboy knows that Euclidian geometry, the founda-
tion for modern physics, is largely based upon unproven axioms. Sta-
tistics, that branch of mathematics which is frequently used for the 
testing and verification of scientific hypotheses, operates within the realm 
of probability rather than of certainty, and the probability upon which 
the scientist makes his predictions is often based on arbitrary weight-
•0 Kuhn, op . . cit., p. 8. 
•
1Cf Arthur Pap, Element s of Analytic Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1949), 
Chapter 16; E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modem Physical Science 
(New York: Harcourt, 1925). 
4 2 Hans Reichenbach, "The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relati-
48 Cf. Herb ert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (New York: Mac-
millan, 1965), p. 131; Alfred Whitehead, Science and the Modem World (New 
York: Macmillan, 1925), p. 13. 
44 Cf Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scienti-fic 
Method (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, Inc., 1937), Chapters 12 and 15; 
Hans Reichenbach, "Probability Methods in Social Science," in Lerner and Lasswell, 
op. cit., Chapter VII. 
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ing,« Such tests are made in terms of concepts which are operationally 
defined rather than directly testable. As Hubert Blalock has explained: 
Mathematics makes use of deductive reasoning in which one goes 
from a set of definitions, assumptions, and rules of operation to a 
set of conclusions by means of purely logical reasoning. Mathe-
matics per se tells us nothing new about reality since all the con-
clusions are built into the original definitions, assumptions and 
rules and are not determined empirically. 45 
Science is merely a human invention conrtrived to liberate mankind 
from its own ignorance. As an instrument for human progress, it re-
mains susceptible to the individual and cultural biases of those who put 
it to use. Notwithstanding demands for objectivity, reliability and pre-
cision, no scientific technique has been developed to provide a shield of 
protection against error. The most revolutionary discoveries of modem 
science often serve to document rf:he commission of prior mistakes. The 
product of scientific efforts will continue to serve as an invitation to 
refinement and revision. As Einstein has admitted: 
( In science) sense experiences are the given subject matter. But 
the theo1y that shall interpret them is man-made. It is the result 
of an extremely laborious process of adaptation: Hypothetical, 
never completely final, always subject to question or doubt. 46 
It is not being argued here that the work of natural scientists is 
unreliable or that science itself should not be considered a rigorous form 
of inquiry. What Feigl has called "intersubjective testability", the vali-
dation of knowledge claims with observable evidence, continues to dis-
tinguish science from other forms of investigation, most notably meta-
physics. The point rto be made here is that we must recognize the real 
limits of science so that behavioralists who seek to be accepted into the 
scientific community are not unjustly excluded for a failure to live up 
to otherwise unattainable standards. 
An examination of the criteria set down by Professor Feigl to 
distinguish science from other forms of inquiry has shown thus far that 
these criteria represent ideals that neither natural nor behavioral 
scientists have been able to fully operationalize. Feigl's final criterion 
for distinguishing scientific investgation involves the scope or com-
prehensiveness of its knowledge. Those who would argue for the 
45 Blaloclc, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 21. 
4 8 Einstein, op. cit., p. 13. 
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superiority of natw-al science over social science might base their case 
on the idea that although the naturalists have not yet been totally suo-
cessful in realizing the ideals of science, they have been more successful 
than behavioralists. To state it another way, one might argue that 
natw-al scientists have done a more complete job in explaining the 
world about us than have behavioralists. Morris Cohen has related this 
factor to the nature of the phenomena with which social scientists are 
concerned. According to his description, social questions are inherently 
more complicated than those of physics or biology because they are less 
repeatable in character, are less directly observable, have greater variety 
and less uniformity, and are more difficult to isolate. 47 
The success of any investigation, no matter what the form, is ulti-
mately dependent upon the adequacy of its methods to deal with the 
matters at hand. The problems anticipated by Cohen are similar to 
those refen-ed to in the writing of Charles Merriam. Nevertheless, 
despite the apparent validity of these claims they should not be mistak-
ingly applied to conclude that behavioralism has been non scientific, nor 
that it has been less scientific or less successful than natw-al science. 
We do not propose to disprove the conclusions listed here nor 
would we even hope to dispute them. However we would refuse to 
accept them on the grounds that they defy verification. In order to 
compare the level of success which natw-alists and behavioralists have 
achieved in explaining the mysteries of the universe one would need to 
measure the accumulated knowledge in each field, which of course is 
impossible. If, as Cohen tells us, the social order is more complex than 
the physical environment, then the argument might be made that social 
scientists have done a rather commendable job in relation to their 
naturalist colleagues. Nevertheless at the present stage of his intellectual 
development, man is not even certain how long the knowledge claims 
in either field will withstand the evidence of new discoveries. Therefore 
such a comparison is at best an act of speculation. 
In the last analysis we can merely compare behavioralism and 
natw-al science in terms of the common ideals which neither has 
managed to convert into completely operable standards. Until a method 
is designed to measure how each has approximated these ideals, there 
is no reason to assume the intellectual superiority of one over the other. 
There is no reason to exclude behavioralism from the reahn of science. 
•
1 Cohen, Reason and Nature (New York: Harcourt, Brace , & Company, 1931), 
pp. 250-251.M 
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III. POLITICS, SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 
IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE 
_ We have already noted that there are two distinct aspects of the 
policy science approach within the behavioral movement: a research 
phase concerned with the acquisition of information and an applicational 
phase concerned with the output of public policy. In order for scientific 
knowledge to be most significant in a political sense, it must be em-
ployed by government officials who are capable of making authoritative 
decisions. Experience has shown us that such is not always the case. 
For example, despite the fact that by 1954 fourteen major studies were 
completed which linked cigarette smoking to serious diseases, it was not 
until 1965 when legislation appeared which required such information 
to appear on cigarette packages. At present there is no reason to expect 
that this poisenous commodity will be banned from the open market in 
the near future. Recent efforts to pass national gun control legislation 
have failed when crime statistics reflect a rise in the number of personal 
assaults committed with illegally held hand guns. While social statistics 
had long since demonstrated the need for national health insurance to 
provide Americans with the most vital professional service, it was not 
until 1965, after a generation of debate, that medicare legislation was 
adopted. 
Examples of such apparent irrationality within government are 
legion. The explanation can be found by examining the very principles 
upon which the political system is designed. Madison referred to this 
phenomenon as "factionalism". According to his definition, a faction 
is ... 
a number of citizens ... who are united and actuated by some 
common impluse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or to the permanent aggregate interests of the com-
munity. 48 
Until this day our government has remained susceptible to the influence 
of powerful interests, such as the tobacco industry, the National Rifle 
Association and the American Medical Association, who would ignore 
scientific prudence in order to advance limited ends which are not neces-
sarily consistent with the general welfare. 
In search of a remedy for the problem of factionalism, Madison 
identified liberty as its first cause. However, in accordance with the 
other framers of the Constitution, Madison realized that the elimination 
~ Federalist Paper, Number 10, ( New York: Mentor Books, 1961), p . 78. 
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of liberty would destroy the political life of the democracy. He found 
the second cause of factions to exist in the diversity of opinions, passions 
and interests among men and concluded that any effort to eliminate 
such human diversity would be impracticable . 
Modem science has made man more capable of dealing with the 
second cause of factions, but in so doing it has created a force which is 
no less threat ening to the vitality of democracy than would be the 
elimination of political freedom. We have seen that science is not only 
an effort to explain the world about us but also a means to control it 
As the interest of science turns from the physical to the social environ-
ment , then the object of manipulation and control must necessarily be 
human. This is not to suggest that political behavioralists have espoused 
the idea of a "technology of behavior" which has been advocate d by 
Skinnerian psychologists.49 However, the fact remains that technici ans 
have now devised methods of mass communication which make it pos-
sible to affect if not control human "opinions, passions and intere sts." 
Commenting on the future of America in a "technetronic age", Brzezinski 
has warned, "Human conduct will become less spontaneous and less 
mysterious-more predetermined and subject to deliberate program-
ming." 60 In a more radical statement on American life in a post-
industrial era Betram Gross has warned against the emergence of a new 
form of "friendly fascism." ni It is no longer sufficient for behavior alists 
to ask, "Can politics be scientific?" The key question before behavi oral-
ists today is, "In what ways can we maximize the utility of science in 
government without endangering the health of democracy?" 
Convinced that it would be unreasonable to attempt eliminating 
the causes of factionalism in American politics, Madison chose to deal 
with its effects. In so doing he expressed a faith that the instituti onal 
arrangement of government could be used to counterbalance the forces 
of self interest. 62 In search for a method of dealing with the growth of 
science in a way which is advantageous to the republic, we would also 
look towards the institutional framework of government. Of parti cular 
interest to us in this case is the modem phenomenon we know as 
bureaucracy. 
49 See B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 
Inc., pp . 1-23. 
50 Brzezinski, "America in a Technectronic Age," Encounter (January, 1968 ) 
p . 17. 
51 Gross, "Friendly Fascism : A Model For America," Social Policy (November / 
December 1970) . 
52 While Madison's system of checks and balances draws heavily from Montes-
quieu , it is noteworthy that his idea was quite consistent with the mechanical view 
of the universe which dominated the scientific-social thought of the Enlightenme nt . 
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Max Weber perceived bureaucracy as an instrument which serves 
to rationalize the means of production and administration. In looking 
towards government bureaucracy as an agent for a more scientific 
politics, we do not pretend that these institutions remain remote from 
the influence of powerful interests. Nor is it assumed that these institu-
tions operate according to the strict laws of science or reason. To begin 
with, Weber himself emphasized the distinction between substantive 
rationality concerned with the definition of values or ends and formal 
rationality which deals with a technology of means. It is only the latter 
form which be ascribed to bureaucratic institutions. Secondly, the 
Weberian model of bureaucracy to which we subscribe is an ideal type. 
The rational and scientific superiority of these organizations must be 
understood in relation to the other kinds of institutions which Weber 
described in his typology of political structures. 
There are two basic characteristics of bureaucratic institutions 
which facilitate their performing according to rational and scientific 
standards. The first of these, is their technical superiority. As Weber 
explains, 
Bureaucratic administration means the exercise of control on the 
basis of knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specif-
ically rational . . . Bureaucracy is superior in knowledge, including 
both technical knowledge and knowledge of concrete facts within 
its own sphere of interest. 63 
No organ of government has written its possession the professional 
expertise, technical equipment or scientific data which are commonly 
housed within the bureaucracy. The attributes have been enhanced 
by the growth of professionalism within the various public services. 
Career civil servants now have the opportunity to attend college and 
university programs in urban planning, police science, environmental 
protection, health service and various other fields of public administra-
tion where they are taught skills which serve to increase their individual 
competence and improve the performance level of the agencies in which 
they are employed.H The recent financial plight which had encumbered 
many American cities has served as an added incentive for public of-
ficials to seek out better trained executive and middle management 
personnel capable of bringing new ideas and improved administrative 
1>3 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. by Talcott 
Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 339. 
64 See Harold Lasswell, A pre-View of Policy Sciences (New York: American 
Elsevier Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 4-13, 132-159. 
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methods into the government service. We have witnessed the develop-
ment of new technological discoveries such as methodone for the treat-
ment of dmg addicts and polymerized water for more effective fire 
fighting. Advances in the study of criminal behavior now permit police 
officials with computerized hazard rating systems to predict the time, 
place and circumstances in which criminal activity is most likely to 
occur. 55 Such technological and behavioral devices provide us with 
evidence that there is indeed a scientific revolution occurring within our 
government bureaucracies which enables these institutions to deal with 
chronic social problems in a more rational effective way. 
The second characteristic of bureaucratic organization with which 
we are concerned is its hierarchic structure. In some way this feature is 
a function of the first, for authority within the bureaucracy is delegate d 
to some extent on the basis of technical qualification or expertise. It is 
the hierarchic structure of these institutions which facilitates th eir 
capacity to mobilize and coordinate the human, material and techni cal 
resources at their command. Barnard and Simon have written extensively 
on the means available to bureaucratic leaders for motivating coopera-
tion among employees. 66 More recently public officials have institu ted 
the practice of productivity bargaining in negotiating contracts with 
powerful unions where employee benefits are exchanged for a high er 
quality and quantity of public service.67 However, while bureaucra tic 
organization facilitates the scientific functions of manipulation and con-
trol, it does not necessarily present the threat of technocratic depo tism. 
A multiplicity of restraints, both internal and external tend to limit 
the power of bureaucratic leaders. Bertram Gross has analysed the 
situation quite succinctly by describing bureaucratic organizations as 
"polyarchal structures" of "shared responsibility". He explains: 
Superior hierarchic authority is never absolute. At the lower levels 
it is always confined to a certain area of operation and limited by 
superior authority. At the peak of the organization it is always 
limited to the purposes of the organization as well as being sub-
jected to various external restraints. 68 
5ll See Edward V. Hamilton, "Productivity: The New York City Approach," 
Public Administration Review XXXII (Nov-Dec., 1972). 
56 Chester Barnard, The Funct-ions of The Executive ( Cambridge: Harvar d 
University Press, 1938). Chapter XI; Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior ( New 
York: Macmillan, 1945), Chapters VI-VII. 
57 See Chester A. Newland, "Personnel Concerns in Government Productivi ty 
Improvement" Public Administration Review, Vo. XXXII (November-December, 
1972), 807-815. 
58 Gross, The Managing of Organizations Vol. I (New York: Free Press, 1964), 
p. 371. 
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Since authority within these structures is delegated on the basis of 
technical skill, the jurisdiction of bureaucratic officials is usually limited 
to a specialized sphere of competence. Specialization tends to decen-
tralize power. For example while a systems analyst in the Defense 
department may enjoy considerable discretion within his specific func-
tional area, be would not ordinarily exercise any influence over matters 
in another area such as health or education. 
Herbert Simon has emphasized that although bureaucratic leaders 
enjoy a good deal of power within their respective jurisdictions, their 
behavior is conditioned by the fact that they have internalized the goals 
of the organizations to which they belong. 59 This observation is quite 
significant for it leads us to a consideration of power in a way which 
serves to illustrate a key deficiency in the approach commonly utilized 
by political scientists in their study of this all important concept. 
Lasswell's assumption that "the influential are those who get what-
ever there is to get" implies that power is a commodity which merely 
serves the interests of those who wield it. Although the decision making 
approach Lasswell later adopted amounted to a rejection of his earlier 
elitist conclusions, the pluralist theory which evolved from his new 
approach continued analyzing power merely as a self serving commodity. 
The major innovation of the pluralists is that they identified the in-
fluential ( or decision makers) as a multiplicity of self serving elites.60 
Bureaucratic power, as it is perceived by Simon, functions to realize the 
goals of the bureaucracy. Since the objectives of these governmental 
institutions are essentially public, then the benefits resulting from their 
successful performance must also be public, whether these objectives 
involve preventive health, waste disposal or the erection of public 
housing. The impact of this phenomenon is further exaggerated by the 
growth of professionalism to which we have already referred. Individ-
uals who identify their careers with a particular public service will seek 
to increase the efficiency of their organizations in canying out their 
particular governmental functions. 6' · 
Of course, it would be naive to assert that bureaucratic leaders are 
not motivated by the same selfish impulses which pervade all of politics. 
These officials have also been known to seek to maximize the resources at 
their command almost as a matter of principle, even when the very pur-
59 Simon, op. cit., p. 11. 
60 A more extensive critique of the pluralist approach is found in Joseph P. 
Viteritti, Police, Politics and Pluralism in New York City (Beverly Hills and London: 
Sage Professional Paper in Administrative and Policy Studies 03-004 1973) pp. 
8-12, 46-49. ' ' ' 
81 For an empirical case study which supports this point see Viteritti, op. cit., 
19-22, 61-65. 
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pose of their existence is the subject of vigorous political debate. Such an 
attitude, not withstanding the element of interest, can not be separa ted 
from the fact that bureaucrats, whatever their function, often tends to 
perceive their career missions and the public welfare as one and the 
same. 
Whether or not our government wants a more effective defense 
system in a time of peace, as opposed to better health care or more 
adequate housing, at a higher cost to the taxpayer is to some extent a 
question of values. As we have already emphasized, and Weber would 
agree, such questions are not susceptible to scientific solution. The policy 
science approach is merely an attempt to rationalize the instruments of 
government in terms of predetermined goals or values. Bureaucra tic 
institutions contain the technical means .to advance the progress of 
behavioral and natural science along with the organizational structure 
to utilize the resulting knowledge in the performance of their govern-
mental functions. 
In the last analysis however, the determination of which govern-
mental functions will be given priority over others are not resolved 
within the bureaucracy. These questions are ultimately decided in the 
legislative branch of government which is popularly elected and highly 
responsive to the demands of powerful organized interests. Herein lies 
a basic strength and a basic weakness of the current instituti onal 
arrangement. The control of bmeaucratic resources by other branc hes 
of government tends to offset the danger of a bureaucratic or tech-
nocratic despotism. However the determination of public priorities by 
elected officials leaves such important questions open to the influence of 
powerful self-motivated interests. 
Despite Skinner's hopes to the contrary, science has not yet devised 
a method to eliminate the selfish character within human nature. Science 
provides us with a means to rationalize the instruments through which 
society goes about achieving its goals, but it can not determine toward 
what values these goals should be directed. Science can inform the 
government and the public of the imminent consequences of alterna tive 
policies, yet there is no mechanism within government which can insure 
that the dictates of science will be heeded by those responsible for 
making decisions. As Madison has long since taught us, such is the 
price of freedom in a democratic state. Given the tentative nature of 
scientific wisdom perhaps it is not a bad exchange. 
